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TRAVEL INTO THE FUTURE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
Richard F. Storrow  
 
Today, cross-border assisted reproductive care can in many cases be 
pursued with impunity, given the policy of free movement of goods and services 
that serves as a cornerstone of unity in Europe and North America. Travel in the 
future of reproductive technology, however, will occasion risks that reproductive 
travelers have not faced since the days when Germany and Ireland engaged in 
internationally condemned practices aimed at punishing their citizens who 
crossed into other countries to obtain abortions illegal at home.  In countries 
where pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of embryos is outlawed because it is 
believed to be dangerously akin to eugenics, travel to evade the law has 
commenced and will increase as low-cost methods of conducting such diagnoses 
enter the market.  What the future of crossing borders for reproductive 
technology holds, then, lies in part in the extraterritorial effect that countries will 
choose to give their laws in a globalizing world. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Procreation is a powerful human drive that inspires such deep religious, 
moral, and ethical convictions that, at a fundamental level, we know we need to 
pay close attention to and thoughtfully examine the implications of innovations 
in reproductive technology. Andrew Torrance’s vivid account of the profound 
impact inexpensive genetic tests will have on human reproduction raises a host of 
intriguing questions about the future of reproductive technology.
1
  In at least one 
respect, the future is now: with every innovation that places assisted reproduction 
within the reach and awareness of millions of individuals around the world come 
calls for restraint.  We fear many things—threats to the health of patients and 
offspring, the exploitation of third-party participants in the quest to bear children, 
and taints on the reputations of physicians and governments insufficiently 
responsive to all that is at stake.   
Torrance believes that enhancements in genetic technologies coupled 
with recent significant changes to patent law may alter the calculus of innovation 
and access in the realm of reproductive technologies.
2
  He foresees a future in 
which inexpensive genetic tests may greatly expand access by individual patients 
to very specific knowledge about the reproductive experience they are likely to 
have, perhaps most significantly the probability of success and the risks that will 
attend the process for both prospective parents and potential offspring.
3
  As with 
any technology designed to satisfy consumer demand, the increasing efficacy of 
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genetic tests and the expected drop in their cost over time will tap new markets 
for information about the genetic determinants of human traits. 
A potential wrinkle in such a future is the very legal regime that makes 
the development of genetic tests attractive to innovators and entrepreneurs.  This 
interplay between patent and innovation plays out according to a familiar script, 
the “orthodox view” in Torrance’s parlance.
4
  Gene sequences are significant in 
scientific endeavor because their discovery may lead to the development of 
important diagnostics and other products.  Without the protection of the limited 
monopoly of patent, we are told, scientific innovators will lack incentives to 
invest capital in developing new technologies of this sort.
5
  Patent protection is 
necessary, then, to inhibit access to new technologies at precisely the moment 
they appear poised to be of the most benefit.
6
  Requiring people to pay for the 
technology they want to use creates the proper incentive for scientists and 
entrepreneurs to develop technology further.  Without patents, so the story goes, 
there might well be no technology to resort to. 
The familiar script takes an unfamiliar turn when it comes to mapping 
the human genome.  The development in patent law that concerns Torrance
7
 and 
others is the extension of patent protection (which seems perfectly appropriate 
for techniques developed to detect the presence of certain gene sequences) to the 
gene sequences themselves.  The immediate question in the battle for ownership 
of the human genome is whether gene sequences, since they are naturally 
occurring, are appropriate subject matter for patents at all.
8
  Then there is the 
policy question: might patenting gene sequences actually undermine innovation 
in this area?
9
  Might gene patents have the even more perverse effect of 
facilitating the exploitation of patients and disenfranchised communities and 
jeopardizing individual and public health?
10
  If so, perhaps human rights 
principles of equality and dignity should control over more technical arguments 
about innovation and technological advancement.
11
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A clear line has yet to be drawn between patents on diagnostic techniques 
and patents on gene sequences.
12
  The law in this area is still in flux. Trial court 
rumblings signal impatience with gene patents,
13
 but it will be many years before 
this question is resolved. In the meantime, given the current state of the patent 
law landscape, it seems likely that patents on specific gene sequences and patents 
on the diagnostics themselves will inhibit access to the tests people want for 
mapping their reproductive lives.   
Torrance’s prescience is his insight that truly “low-cost” genetic tests 
will depend to a large extent on the direction of patent law. This response 
recognizes that some jurisdictions will refuse to permit pre-implantation genetic 
testing altogether.  Given these dynamics, potential consumers of such tests will 
travel to jurisdictions where they are permitted or are less expensive.
14
  Travel in 
the future of reproductive technology may entail some dangers, however.  If 
current indicators are not mere isolated instances, we may see either 
extraterritorial prosecution of such travel or other legal responses aimed at 
making it less likely that consumers of low-cost genetic tests have anything to 
gain from a cross-border quest to attain their reproductive goals.   
  
II.  CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE CARE 
 
The existence of patents that would make genetic tests prohibitively 
expensive for many or would place second opinions out of financial reach, makes 
it probable that those with the financial means to do so will travel to jurisdictions 
where these tests and related care remain affordable.  In addition, where genetic 
testing is outlawed, travel to permissive jurisdictions will ensue.  Travel for 
genetic testing, then, will take its place alongside other forms of medical tourism 
that is pursued in the quest for health care that is either too expensive or 
prohibited at home.  Indeed, the evidence shows that cross-border 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) is already a going concern.
15
 
At its root, travelling abroad to acquire assisted reproduction that is out 
of reach locally is an exercise of personal autonomy.
16
  Nonetheless, unfettered 
choice in matters of assisted reproduction is not a feature of most developed 
countries, where the general conviction is that reproductive choice is justifiably 
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constrained by legal regulation.
17
  The laissez-faire approach of the United States 
is of course an exception, but most other developed countries have enacted 
comprehensive legislative schemes that can be categorized in the following 
manner:  (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.
18
  Permissive 
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Spain exhibit tolerance toward 
most well-known forms of assisted reproduction except commercial surrogacy.
19
  
These jurisdictions typically allow the use of third-party gametes and embryos 
and do not limit access to assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) based on 
marital status or sexual orientation.  Research using supernumerary embryos, the 
cloning of embryos for stem cell research, and the selection of embryos with the 
aid of pre-implantation diagnosis are also permitted in liberal jurisdictions.
20
   
Cautious jurisdictions such as France and Denmark do not have widespread 
restrictions but nonetheless have strict rules requiring anonymity in gamete 
donation
21
 and bans on surrogacy.
22
  Cautious jurisdictions may allow pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) only in special cases and may prohibit 
the creation of embryos through in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) or therapeutic 
cloning for research purposes.
23
  Cautious jurisdictions may, however, permit 
research on embryos that remain from couples who have completed their 
infertility treatment.
24
  In addition to these restrictions on practice, France permits 
only stable heterosexual couples to have access to assisted reproduction.
25
  The 
prohibitive approach stands in contrast to the liberal approach by placing limits 
on embryo and stem cell research and embryo selection following PGD.
26
    
Prohibitive countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, for 
example, outlaw techniques that are elsewhere embraced as mainstream 
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procedures. In these jurisdictions, oocyte donation is banned outright.
27
 Austria 
and Italy also prohibit sperm donation in IVF.
28
  In addition to banning these 
forms of third-party gamete donation, Switzerland prohibits PGD.
29
  It is joined 
in this restriction by Chile, China, Ivory Coast, and the Philippines.
30
  Although 
not always requiring PGD, non-medical sex selection is banned in the United 
Kingdom, India, Canada, and Taiwan.
31
    
Cross-border reproductive travel out of cautious and prohibitive 
jurisdictions to more permissive jurisdictions is well known,
32
 and, at least when 
conducted within Europe, is protected by the principle of free movement of 
persons enshrined in the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
33
  In 
addition, movement out of permissive and laissez-faire jurisdictions occurs with 
an aim to acquire treatment more quickly, to reduce costs, or to acquire treatment 
that is simply not offered in the country of origin “because it is not considered 
sufficiently safe or because it is still under experimental evaluation.”
34
 
Markets for cross-border reproductive transactions and for medical 
tourism generally have developed in a multiplicity of countries in response to 
international demand.
35
  The business is authentically global in scope in that 
cross-border movements are sometimes facilitated by clinics or brokers at home 
who have partnerships abroad.  For example, an agency in the United States may 
refer couples needing surrogacy services to clinics in India or Ukraine.
36
  
Physicians in Italy or Turkey, where artificial insemination is banned, may refer 
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couples to nearby Switzerland, Greece, or Cyprus.
37
  Destination countries in the 
developing world are coming forward to generate foreign demand with language 
pitched to consumerist sensibilities.
38
  Some of these countries may soon enact 
laws that will make it easier for consumers to obtain the services they desire.
39
     
Although cross-border reproductive care exists at the intersection of 
cross-border medical care and assisted reproduction, and thus raises many of the 
same concerns arising in those contexts, some concerns are particularly salient 
when it comes to crossing borders.  By crossing borders, patients are seeking a 
different legal, economic, or service-delivery climate than exists at home.  Thus, 
five primary concerns arise from cross-border reproductive travel:  (1) 
compromised access to necessary health care services at home;
40
 (2) the sacrifice 
of distributive justice when access to necessary procedures depends upon the 
ability to travel;
41
 (3) the quality and safety of services both at home and 
abroad;
42
 (4) whether responsible citizenship is undermined by traveling abroad 
to evade the law at home;
43
 and (5) the exploitation of or harm to individuals and 
communities that have become the destinations of reproductive travel.
44
  Related 
to this last concern is evidence that where clinics in developing countries step 
forward to fulfill foreign demand, there is now “an emerging divide between 
those clinics offering health services to local patients, and those concentrating on 
the provision of services for foreign clients.”
45
  This can lead to fewer resources 
to attend to the health care of the local population,
46
 including the migration of 
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health care personnel into the private sector.
47
  Elizabeth Jenner calls this 
phenomenon the “fragmentation of health care in settings of exploitation.”
48
 
Commentators on restrictions on assisted reproduction and reproductive 
tourism have made valuable contributions to the academic literature.  Bioethicist 
Guido Pennings has published comprehensive analyses of various methods of 
responding to reproductive tourism and has theorized that reproductive tourism 
permits moral pluralism to flourish.
49
  Legal scholars June Carbone and Paige 
Gottheim urge the cultivation of public trust through regulatory creativity and 
flexibility as a way to achieve compliance from the citizens burdened by 
restrictive laws.
50
  Although Carbone and Gottheim urge relaxation of certain 
restrictions, their proposal has the advantage of avoiding the “race to the bottom” 
that some associate with calls for international harmonization of laws.
51 
 The 
research of anthropologist Marcia Inhorn and physician Pasquale Patrizio reveals 
that “[l]egal barriers . . . bespeak the politics of exile,”
52
 and indeed, in qualitative 




In my own work, I have considered how cross-border reproductive care 
itself might affect countries where clinics have expressed a particular eagerness 
to meet rising foreign demand for their services.
54
  Some of these effects include 
a surge in egg donation among young women and the possibility that fertility 
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in Europe in the Area of Assisted Conception—Room for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD: 
THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 305-24 (D Evans ed., 1996)). 
52 Marcia C. Inhorn & Pasquale Patrizio, Rethinking Reproductive ”Tourism” as Reproductive 
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53  Id. at 906. 
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tourists might consume treatments at a rate that could price some citizens of the 
host country out of the market for infertility care.  It is further my belief that the 
policy of freedom of movement thought essential to European unification allows 
local laws restricting reproductive options to flourish by facilitating the 
exportation of objectionable behavior which in turn tempers resistance to these 
laws at home.
55
  I have argued most recently that the laws themselves fail to live 
up to important standards associated with the judicial protection of fundamental 
rights in democratic states.
56
  The now pressing question is whether states will 
elect to prosecute citizens who travel abroad for treatment outlawed at home or 
will raise other legal roadblocks aimed at undermining the quest to grow one’s 
family through cross-border reproductive care.   
 
III.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
 
Assuming the will and wherewithal to do so, countries with strict policies 
against the use of genetic diagnostics in matters concerning human reproduction 
may take one of two directions in an attempt to force compliance.  First, states 
may decide to extend the reach of their prosecutorial powers to instances in 
which their citizens procure the prohibited tests overseas.  Alternatively, states 
may attempt to dissuade their citizens from procuring cross-border PGD by 
withholding legal recognition from the children its citizens have crossed borders 
to conceive, bear, and rear.  Although there is no evidence that states have 
employed these tactics against those who travel abroad to obtain PGD, Turkey 
has passed a statute criminalizing women who travel abroad for alternative 
insemination, and countries around the world have begun to resist recognition of 
children born to their citizens via cross-border commercial surrogacy.  
 
A.  Prosecution of Reproductive Tourism 
 
Although prosecuting cross-border assisted reproductive care has 
previously been unknown, Turkey, seeking to uphold its statute criminalizing the 
concealment of a child’s paternity, recently announced that it would imprison 
women for up to three years should they seek to become pregnant via artificial 
insemination abroad.
57
  New regulations also prohibit Turkish clinics from 
serving as agents for foreign infertility clinics.
58
  Prior to the issuance of the new 
regulations, “inter-clinic collaborations facilitated covert and seamless 
treatments” linking Turkish patients with clinics in Cyprus.
59
  The Turkish 
regulations criminalizing patients are reminiscent of Germany’s former attempts, 
by means of forced gynecological examinations, to enforce its anti-abortion law 
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at its border with Holland.
60
  The regulations criminalizing physicians are 
reminiscent of Italy’s determination to prosecute doctors who referred patients 
abroad after Italy’s enactment of restrictions on assisted reproduction in 2004.
61
  
The legal doctrine of extraterritoriality plays a respected role in 
international law, allowing a state not only to express the importance of its 
legislation but to give it instrumental force as well, within limits.  Although 
extraterritorial prosecution would be “the most coercive and repressive manner” 
of preventing cross-border reproductive care, and would dangerously “increase 
feelings of frustration, suppression, and indignation,”
62
 giving the law 





  Nonetheless, laws are not automatically 
extraterritorially applicable: there is a presumption against a law’s having 
extraterritorial effect.  In the absence of clear statutory language exhibiting an 
intent that a statute operate extraterritorially, a state is permitted to express its 
interest in controlling the conduct of its citizens even when they are outside of 
the country.
65
  This is known as the nationality principle. An example of the 
nationality principle is Canada’s determination to prosecute Canadians who 
engage in the sexual exploitation of children while abroad,
66
 even though other 
governments exhibit indifference toward this behavior.
67
 The United Kingdom 
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Netherlands and Switzerland will not prosecute a citizen for the crime of sex tourism committed in 
another country, unless his action constitutes an offence that violates the law in both countries, the 
country of origin and the country of destination where the crime has been committed.”  MOHAMED 
Y. MATTAR, A REGIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SEX TRAFFICKING AND SEX TOURISM 
(2005), http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Regional-Comparative-
Legal-Analysis.pdf.   This approach to extraterritoriality is known as double criminality.  Id.  Under 
a double criminality approach, the country may be barred from prosecuting if the offender was 




will also prosecute such behavior, but only if it is illegal in the country where 
committed.
68
  Another limited exception to the general presumption against 
extraterritoriality is embodied in the objective territorial principle.  This 
principle holds that a state may legislate against conduct abroad that has harmful 
effects within the state even if the conduct was committed by a foreigner.
69
  
In its debates over whether in some way to penalize the decision of British 
infertility patients to evade the law by travelling overseas, the British House of 
Commons heard the testimony of Professor Margaret Brazier to the effect that, 
“’No system of regulation can eliminate or effectively control procreative 
tourism.’”
70
  The House of Commons agreed with Brazier, stating, “We believe 
that any attempts to curtail reproductive tourism would not be justified by the 
seriousness of the offence.  Moreover, it would be impossible to enforce if the 
treatment was legal in the country concerned.”
71
  Brazier was careful to limit her 
remarks to democratic systems committed to the free movement of persons.  In 
this connection, she commented: 
 
Extra-territoriality is a very difficult area of criminal jurisdiction.  For a 
very long time we have limited our extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
offences such as homicides and offences against the Crown: sedition 
and treason.  I do not believe that such extensive invasions of personal 
freedom would be compatible with either the European Union treaties 





The Turkish assertion of extraterritoriality over cross-border 
reproductive care does not carry with it quite the same number of problematic 
ramifications as would attend a member state of the European Union’s 
determination to do likewise.  Extraterritorial prosecution of a European citizen 
seeking assisted reproduction banned at home in another European country 
would not be permitted under the freedom of movement guaranteed by the 
                                                                                                                         
prosecuted in the host country or may be barred from imposing a sentence higher than could have 
been imposed in the host country.  Id.  
68 British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Child sex tourism, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-
and-living-abroad/be-a-responsible-tourist/child-sex-tourism (last visited Dec. 26, 2010). 
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) 
(1990).  Extraterritoriality based on the objective territorial principle has received a great deal of 
attention primarily due to its role in redressing environmental and economic harms.  See articles 
collected in volume 50 of Law and Contemporary Problems; see also AVC Nederland B.V. v. 
Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 
817 (11th Cir. 1984); Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Comm’n des Communautés Européenes, 1972 C.J. 
Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557; Auten L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law 
from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009).  
70 HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 164, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/7i.pdf.   
71 Id. at 166. 
72 Id. at 165. 






  Moreover, the Turkish law is explicitly extraterritorial such 
that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the law is 
overcome.  Since it is outside of the scope of these brief remarks to explore the 
evidentiary hurdles that would attend any attempted enforcement of this law
74
 or 
to discuss what effect this law will have on Turkey’s bid to become a member of 
the European Union,
75
 it is sufficient to conclude that the law places Turkish 
women at risk of imprisonment should they seek reproductive assistance abroad.  
It is this aspect of the law that sounds a note of caution to those who are 
determined to evade the law of their own country by obtaining low-cost PGD 
abroad. 
 
B.  Legal Interference with Reproductive Tourism 
 
Instead of criminalizing cross-border reproductive travel, many countries 
use their laws to interfere with reproductive tourism in other ways.  They may 
refuse to issue a visa for the new child to return home with her parents after the 
birth or, after a successful return to the home country, may refuse legal 
recognition of the parent-child relationships that have resulted from a transaction 
abroad that would have been illegal at home. Even if the country is willing to 
recognize a parent-child relationship, it may refuse to bestow citizenship upon 
the child.  This is especially likely in cases of surrogacy, which is heavily 
restricted or outlawed by many countries around the world and is much easier for 
officials to detect
76
 than are cases of alternative insemination, egg, or embryo 
donation that result in the pregnancy of the intending mother abroad but the birth 
of the child in the home country. 
Unlike the kind of law enacted by Turkey, interference of this sort is 
quite common.  Citizens of several European and Asian countries, including the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Japan have been 
refused travel documents for their children by consular officials upon suspicion 
that they had engaged in international commercial surrogacy in the United States, 
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Kelland et al., Unequal access drives fertility tourism, experts say, REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68C57P20100914. “The authorities,” Guido Pennings 
notes, “generally do not know who is going where for what.”  Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as 
Moral Pluralism in Motion, supra note 49, at 339. 
75 See Gateway to the European Union, Enlargement, http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2010). 
76 In one French case, consular officials in Los Angeles refused to issue a visa “en raison de 
l'impossibilité de produire un certificat d'accouchement de l'épouse et d'une suspicion de gestation 
pour autrui.”  Cour de Cassation, Case No. 07-20468,   
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arret_no_12031.htm
l (last visited Dec. 26, 2010).   




India, or the Ukraine.
77
  Upon arriving home (the children using passports issued 
by the countries in which they were born), parents have met with official refusal 
to recognize the parent-child relationship or to bestow citizenship upon the 
children.
78
  The French press reports that this happens to about 400 French 
couples each year,
79
 leading lawyer Valérie Depadt-Sebag to designate the 
children “a new category of pariahs”
80
 that reintroduces a distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate long ago expunged from the law.
81
   
 The danger individuals who flout local laws by traveling abroad to 
procure genetic testing in connection with their quest to have children is not quite 
the same as is the danger attending law evasion through international surrogacy.  
Pre-implantation genetic testing is more akin to artificial insemination or egg 
donation in that the procedure occurs prior to the pregnancy of the intending 
mother, whereas surrogacy is by definition a pregnancy that the intending mother 
does not carry.  This renders the problems of international surrogacy much more 
salient and returning home much riskier.  Still, as the Turkish law indicates, 
countries may decide to devote resources to enacting laws that have important 
symbolic if not practical ramifications.  And even merely symbolic laws can 
cause significant emotional and dignitary harm that may not be worth the risk of 
their violation.
82
  In this way, those who would contravene the law of their 
country by seeking PGD in permissive jurisdictions will have additional 
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informational and psychological hurdles to overcome before they will feel secure 
in moving ahead with their reproductive goals.    
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The invention of a readily affordable genetic test that could be used in 
connection with assisted reproduction raises the distinct possibility that citizens 
of countries that already choose or will choose to outlaw such tests will cross 
borders in their quest to procure the technology.  Some will see this cross-border 
movement as an exercise of autonomy that should be respected.  Others will see 
different interests at stake—future children who have a right not to be treated as 
commodities, physicians who should not risk reputational integrity in furtherance 
of a eugenic project, and a society with important dignitary interests to protect.  
Lawmakers will have a crucial choice to make: permit citizens to exercise their 
autonomy by seeking a friendly forum in which to pursue their reproductive 
goals or extend the reach of the law to capture instances of extraterritorial law 
evasion. The choice will not be simple, as each alternative carries weighty 
ramifications for how a society chooses to define responsible parenthood, 
medical practice, and citizenship.     
Those who carry the dream of becoming parents will also have a crucial 
choice.  In a world where barriers to international travel have fallen away and 
regulation of reproductive technology is far from uniform, the range of decisions 
individuals can make about how, when, and where to procreate is wider than it 
has ever been.  But within this world of choice exist legal forces that would 
interfere with if not prevent full and unfettered reproductive decision-making.  
These forces will not affect the powerful human drive to procreate, but they will 
of necessity play into the choices individuals make as they travel into the future 
of reproductive technology.    
 
